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I
INTRODUCTION
PAST CRISES AND RESPONSES
Concern about liability for medical malpractice pervades our health care
delivery system. A national data bank mandated by Congress now tracks all
paid malpractice claims against physicians as well as information about
disciplinary actions. When the Physician Payment Review Commission seeks
to reform Medicare fees for physicians, an integral task is computing
increments for reimbursing liability insurance premiums. Liability issues can
affect medical decisions from obstetrical choice of delivery methods at the
beginning of life to a determination whether to withdraw artificial life support
at its end.
This preoccupation with liability grew to its present. magnitude in a
relatively short time. Less than two decades ago, the general public received
its first reports about what soon afterward was dubbed the "medical
malpractice crisis." Initial pronouncements about its extent and causes
varied. In some circles, it was quickly labeled a key contributor to another
growing concern-escalation of medical costs. Others saw it as a diversion
from more important problems of health care delivery. Pragmatic observers
questioned whether there was sufficient information for realistic assessment of
the perceived problem's dimensions or etiology, or whether the alleged
shortcomings of the tort system were demonstrably greater in the medical
malpractice arena than elsewhere.'
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1. The literature on the "crisis" is voluminous and varied in perspective. See, for example,
Medical Malpractice Insurance and Its Effect on the Delivery of Health Care Services, Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, US House of Rep Commerce Committee, 94th
Cong, 1st Sess No 94-130 (June 15, 1975); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern
Tort Law, 96 Yale LJ 1521 (1987) (evils of crisis). Compare Sylvia A. Law & Steven Polan, Pain and
Profit: The Politics of Malpractice (Harper & Row, 1978); Tony Dunningham & Robin Lane,
Malpractice-The Illusory Crisis, 54 Fla B J 114 (1980) (skeptics).
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The aura of emergency emanated mainly from problems of obtaining
affordable professional liability insurance, especially for physicians in "high
risk" states or specialties. The speed with which availability problems arrived
remains startling, even in retrospect. As late as January 1973, a commission
on medical malpractice appointed by the secretary of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (now DHHS) reported that
malpractice insurance is currently available to health-care practitioners under group
plans and the market for such insurance is competitive. Malpractice insurance is also
available to individual health-care practitioners, although they appear to have more
difficulty in locating insurance sources.2
Soon after the report's release, those conclusions were greeted derisively by
physicians in most parts of the country.
Trying to explain what suddenly produced the serious problems of
insurance availability became an exercise in passion and conjecture for some
and serious introspection for others. Causes most frequently proffered at the
time3 included changes in the legal system, for example, allegedly "special"
rules for health care practitioners; a surfeit of lawyers; insurers' poor
investment results; underwriting uncertainty created by long periods between
incidents of alleged malpractice and their ultimate judicial or administrative
resolution; the medical community's inadequate "self-policing" against the
"bad apples" (often described as less than 10 percent of practitioners who
generated a disproportionate number of claims); increased likelihood of
medical injury resulting from new technology and more complex medical
practice; declining medical practice standards and deterioration in the
traditional physician/patient relationship; excessive costs of the existing
liability compensation system; and alleged popular conviction that patients
experiencing untoward results beyond their control should be compensated.
Aside from the obvious inconsistencies among some of those asserted
explanations, their diversity illustrates the general confusion about what was
happening. This flailing about causes was soon to give way to flailing about
solutions.
Perhaps the more interesting question was how the crisis actually affected
the medical profession. Very demoralizing and damaging results quickly were
cited, many based largely on anecdotal information. These complaints
included increased costly "defensive" medical practices; decreased
willingness to perform needed but "high risk" procedures (sometimes termed
"negative" defensive medicine); "going bare" (practicing medicine without
liability insurance); and "dropping out" of medical practice partially or
entirely.
2. See Department of Health Education and Welfare ("HEW"), Report of The Secretary's
Commission of Medical Malpractice (January 16, 1973).
3. For a sensitive review of what occurred during the period, see Glen 0. Robinson, The Medical
Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A Retrospective, 49 L & Contemp Probs 5 (Spring 1986). For an early,
perceptive review of reform alternatives, see Kenneth S. Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A
Preliminary Analysis, 36 Md L Rev 489, 490-95 (1977). For a general perspective on the origins of the
medical malpractice crisis, see Fred C. Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 Yale LJ 698, 718-22 (1988).
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Many of the most urgent legislative responses involved what was described
aptly as "tinkering" with the tort system, although many states also addressed
issues of insurance or medical quality control. 4 Most responses focusing on
the legal system could be distinguished by whether they modified or
abrogated previous tort rules, introduced new procedural hurdles for
claimants and their attorneys to jump, or were aimed at reducing the size of
awards or the number of claims. At least two dozen types of legal changes
were enacted: Widely adopted reforms included imposing ceilings or "caps"
on damages; modifying the collateral source rule to prevent multiple
recoveries for the same injury; limiting contingent fees; introducing pretrial
screening or review procedures; restricting ad damnum clauses in complaints;
adding new rules for application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur;
promoting arbitration; requiring certification of the meritorious character of a
claim before instituting legal action; mandating or promoting periodic or
structured damage awards; shortening statutes of limitation; and codifying the
doctrine of informed consent.5 A swarm of constitutional challengers turned
to the courts; there were some significant casualties but most provisions
survived judicial scrutiny, often owing to judicial deference to legislative
proclamations of crisis.6
This first wave of reforms tapered off about 1977. The succeeding lull
featured far less concern about malpractice liability, a response reflecting
slower growth and even some declines in claims frequency. 7 A new round of
state legislative activity began in the middle 1980s as the claims experience
again became threatening and the broader liability insurance market saw
availability problems of the sort doctors had experienced in the 1970s. There
was further tinkering with the tort system, consisting largely of the adoption
of earlier reform measures by states that had not done so in the 1970s, as well
as attempts by first-round reformers to fine tune what they had in place.
There was also continued attention to initiating measures involving medical
quality control and insurance,8 and this round of reform saw enactment of
4. Changes in the latter category included encouraging peer review, expanding protection
from actions against physicians participating in peer review, instituting risk management procedures,
and expanding disciplinary powers of agencies regulating medical and hospital practice.
5. For detailed contemporaneous listing and assessment, see Kandy G. Webb, Recent Medical
Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 Tulane L Rev 655 (1976); Comment, An Analysis of State
Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 Duke LJ 1417 (authored by Betsy I. Carter, et
al).
6. A typical legislative package included a "finding" that there was an emergency situation
calling for stern measures to assure continued access to basic health care. Courts continue to pay
attention to such statements. See, for example, McGibony v Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Plan, 564 So 2d 177, 178-79 (Fla App 1990) (upholding Florida's no-fault scheme for
certain birth-defective injuries). After reviewing the legislative history determining existence of a
crisis, the trial court found that the Act was a rational response.
7. The likelihood that the recent changes had contributed significantly to any change in claims
seems unrealistic because most of the recent changes had not been in place long enough.
8. For further elaboration of the reform agenda of the 1980s, see Randall R. Bovbjerg,
Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments and a Preliminary Report Card, 22 UC Davis L Rev
499, 532 (1989). For a negative assessment of the efforts of malpractice tort reform to date, see
Peter C. Carstensen, Two Causes for the Predictable Failure of Contemporary Tort "Reform': Naive Analysis
and Ignorance of Institutional Interaction, 4 Detroit Coil L Rev 975, 975 (1987) (noting that "only
Page 199: Spring 1991]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
specific federal legislation. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
19869 laid the groundwork for the recently operational national data bank
that receives reports of malpractice settlements and significant disciplinary
actions against physicians.' 0 Congress also extended the Product Liability
Risk Retention Act of 1981 to include medical malpractice, which allowed
pooling of liability interests of insureds with comparable risks through "risk
retention groups.""
Debate over malpractice in the 1980s differed significantly from the 1970s.
It was characterized by a recognition that medical injury problems are not
simply a function of shortcomings in the legal system. Participants also called
for more innovative responses. Law-related reactions in two states extended
well beyond "tinkering" and could be classified as radical in comparison with
earlier steps. First Virginia' 2 and then Florida 13 acted to ease insurer and
physician fears of unusually high judgments for certain infants suffering
permanent and severe neurological injury through the delivery process. They
replaced traditional lawsuits with narrowly circumscribed "no-fault" schemes
for that limited purpose. The key impetus in Virginia was fear that obstetrical
services would be sharply curtailed, particularly in rural areas, after
underwriters signaled that new policies for obstetricians would not be issued
without some relief.' 4
Recent stabilization and even decline of medical malpractice insurance
rates has led some reporters to deviate from previously gloomy accounts. A
few seem ready to pronounce the last rites over the crisis' 5 without recalling
the similar hiatus between the bouts of the 1970s and 1980s. Though it is too
early to know whether recent underwriting results signal the start of a longer
trend or a momentary blip in a historically cyclical market pattern, speculation
already has begun about reasons for the recent reversal. New explanations
include expanded protocols for medical. practice, improved quality control
through risk management, improved physician-patient communication, and
delayed impact of reforms on liability premiums.
legislators and other professionally myopic optimists would claim that any positive and lasting
change" has occurred).
9. 42 USC §§ 11101, 11111-11152 (Supp 1988).
10. See id §§ 11131-11137. The Act also provides for immunity from antitrust liability for
professional review actions when certain requirements have been met. Id § I 1111 (a). For further
discussion, see James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Antitrust and Hospital Peer Review, 51 L &
Contemp Probs 7, 82-86 (Spring 1988).
11. Risk Retention Amendments of 1986, Pub L No 99-563, 100 Stat 3170, codified at 15 USC
§§ 3901 et seq (Supp 1991).
12. Va Code §§ 38.2-5000 et seq (Michie, Repl Vol 1990). The Act already has been amended
substantially since its original enactment. For further description of the Act, see note 81.
13. Fla Stat §§ 766.301-316 (Supp 1991).
14. For differing views about the Virginia approach as well as insights about its enactment, see
Richard A. Epstein, Market and Regulatory Approaches to Medical Malpractice: The Virginia Obstetrical No-
Fault Statute, 74 Va L Rev 1451 (1988);Jeffrey O'Connell, Pragmatic Restraints on Market Approaches: A
Response to Professor Epstein, 74 Va L Rev 1457 (1988); Cynthia A. Gallup, Can No-Fault Compensation of
Impaired Infants Alleviate the Malpractice Crisis in Obstetrics?, 14 J Health Pol, Pol'y & L 691 (1989).
15. See, for example, Robert Pear, Insurers Reducing Malpractice Fees for Doctors in U.S., NY Times
Al col 1 (September 23, 1990).
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The preceding catalogues of contemporaneous explanations and
legislative responses could be expanded considerably. But this limited
account should give sufficient perspective on the suddenness of demands on
legislatures, the deep disagreements about causes and effects, and the
diversity of state reforms. This article is not another polemic about crises and
causes. Instead it examines our current understanding of the maze of issues
surrounding legal responses to medical injury, our present position on a
continuum of reform, and some directions in which we might next proceed.
II
A TIME FOR REFLECTION
After staccato bursts of legislative activity and considerable rhetoric, we
have entered a calmer period. Malpractice is gone from the front page for
now. Although this period's duration is uncertain, it affords us time to reflect
on the nature of malpractice problems and on the different attitudes toward
them. But there remains considerable concern about the legal process-
concern that extends well beyond the cyclical nature of insurance problems.
There is also growing appreciation that malpractice issues transcend the legal
system and are deeply entwined with medical practice and complex issues
relating to our health care delivery system. For some members of the medical
profession especially, the present period is also a time of disillusionment
about the utility of legal reforms.
A. Greater Understanding Through New Information
Because many past legislative responses were crafted with scant knowledge
about the nature and dimensions of the problems they sought to remedy,
predicting whether they would succeed was an exercise in guesswork. The
recent increase in information and analysis enhances prospects for tailoring
future changes to accomplish desired goals. This new understanding extends
to the nature and extent of the problems that must be confronted, the relative
effectiveness and unexpected results of malpractice-driven modifications, and
how the tort system functions in the context of malpractice.' 6
A study conducted in California hospitals in 1974 raised many eyebrows
with its finding that 4.65 percent of inpatient hospital stays produced medical
injuries. All of these would be potentially compensable under a full no-fault
scheme, which the authors deemed too expensive at that time. However, 17
percent of the 4.65 percent were found to have resulted from negligence.' 7
16. A number of significant studies were funded by The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation,
which in 1986 initiated a Medical Malpractice Program to sponsor research dealing with the impact
of medical malpractice on health care delivery. Surprisingly little funding had been made available
for such projects previously, and the Program's goal was to encourage research and demonstrations
dealing with medical practice issues, health care organization and management issues, and legal and
insurance issues.
17. Don Harper Mills, John S. Boyden, Jr. & David S. Rubsamen, eds, Report on the Medical
Insurance Feasibility Study (Sutter, 1977).
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This was 1 percent of the total cases, larger by a ratio of ten to one than the
equivalent claims filed for this period."' Until recently, this finding was the
only evidence about the true extent of negligent injury and the shortfall in
claims under the legal system. However, a similar New York study of 1984
hospital records' 9 estimated the incidence of adverse events-whether caused
by negligence or not-at 3.7 percent. Of those, 27.6 percent (again, one
percent of all hospital discharges) were found to have been due to negligence,
eight times as large as the equivalent class of claims.2 0 These findings confirm
that the dimensions of the medical injury problem remain large, and indeed
that the current legal system sees only a small tip of the proverbial iceberg.
The information also can be of great importance in assessing the economic
feasibility of any scheme that would extend compensation to injuries based on
non-negligent conduct.
Growing empirical evidence also exists as to the impact of reform efforts.
The passage of time and increased analytic attention have shown that a
number of legal reforms work as intended, reducing claims payments and
premiums. Other research has evaluated the impact of specific changes in
legal rules. In an earlier symposium in this journal,2' Professor Patricia
Danzon assessed the impact of various reforms. She noted that damage caps
had been the most effective response to claims severity. Of reforms limiting
frequency growth, shorter statutes of limitation seemed to have had the
greatest effect. She also found that arbitration increased claims frequency but
held down severity. Most reforms (for example, screening panels and limits
on contingent fees) had little impact on either frequency or severity of claims.
Other prominent researchers have found similar results, 22 also extending
them to more recent claims data and to effects on premiums. Although one's
conclusion after reviewing such studies is that some tort reforms have helped
slow the growth of liability costs, reforms of this type hardly can be
considered a long term solution given the number of negligent injuries that
may yet become the subject of claims. Moreover, some of the past steps
seemingly have simply been ineffective.
We also better understand how the liability system works and its impact on
the medical profession. What previously had been suspicions or assumptions
that malpractice concerns influence specialty choices (most notably to enter or
18. For further appraisal of these findings and their implications, see Patricia M. Danzon, Medical
Malpractice Theory, Evidence, and Public Policy 19-29 (Harvard U Press, 1985).
19. Harvard Medical Practice Study, Patients, Doctors and Lawyers: Medical Injury, Malpractice
Litigation, and Patient Compensation in New York (Harvard U Press, 1990).
20. Id at 3.
21. See Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Malpractice Claims: New Evidence, 49 L &
Contemp Probs 57, 78-79 (Spring 1986).
22. See Frank A. Sloan & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Medical Malpractice: Crises, Responses and Effects,
Health Ins Ass'n Am Res Bull 18-24 (May 1989); Frank A. Sloan, Paula M. Mergenhagen & Randall
R. Bovbjerg, Effects of Tort Reform on the Value of Closed Medical Malpractice Claims: A Microanalysis, 14 J
Health Pol, Pol'y & L 663-89 (Winter 1989); see generally Stephen Zuckerman, Randall R. Bovbjerg
& Frank A. Sloan, Effects of Tort Reforms and Other Factors on Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums, 27
Inquiry 167 (1990).
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leave obstetrics) have been at least partially confirmed,23 though how
seriously this has affected the availability of services is unclear. Other
evidence indicating how liability concerns have affected physician willingness
to perform certain procedures combine to further illustrate the pervasive
impact of concern about malpractice. 24
With respect to the process of litigation, recent evidence suggests that
juries probably are better decisionmakers than previously supposed. 25
Certainly, some perceived horribles-such as the wholesale imposition of
punitive damages 26-are not major issues. Nonetheless, the increased
documentation of the system's functioning does reveal serious concerns that
could be addressed through creative procedural responses.
It is also becoming clearer that legal changes alone cannot resolve all the
serious problems of medical injury. Studies focusing on non-legal reforms
have found that introduction of protocols in areas such as anesthesiology2 7 or
emergency room handling of patients with symptoms of myocardial
infarction 28 can reduce claims (by reducing injury as well, one hopes). And a
recently completed review of a large body of closed claims stemming from the
handling of high-risk pregnancies should enable development of educational
interventions to improve the level of care in such circumstances. 29
23. See, for example, Roger Rosenblatt, et al, Why Do Physicians Stop Practicing Obstetrics?: The
Impact of Malpractice Claims, 76 Obstetrics and Gynecology 245 (1990); Institute of Medicine, The
Effects of Medical Professional Liability on the Practice of Obstetrics, in 1 Medical Professional Liability and the
Delivery of Obstetrical Care 73 (Nat'l Acad Press, 1989) ("The Practice of Obstetrics").
24. For a review of the information and the results of a survey by the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, see Institute of Medicine, The Effects of Medical Professional Liability on
the Availability of Obstetrical Providers, in 1 Medical Professional Liability and the Delivery of Obstetrical Care 35-
53 (Nat'l Acad Press, 1989). Indicators make a strong case that women in rural areas or with low
incomes are affected most. See Dana Hughes, et al, Obstetrical Care for Low-Income Women: The Effects of
Medical Malpractice on Community Health Centers, in Victoria P. Rostow & RogerJ. Bulger, eds, 2 Medical
Professional Liability and the Delivery of Obstetrical Care 59 (Nat'l Acad Press, 1989); Deborah Lewis-
Ideman, Medical Professional Liability and Access to Obstetrical Care: Is There a Crisis?, in Victoria P. Rostow
& RogerJ. Bulger, eds, 2 Medical Professional Liability and the Delivery of Obstetrical Care 78-96 (Nat'l Acad
Press, 1989); Sloan & Bovbjerg, Health Ins Ass'n Am Res Bull at 33-35 (cited in note 22). See
generally Institute of Medicine, The Practice of Obstetrics (cited in note 23).
25. See, for example, Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging theJury's Shadow,
54 L & Contemp Probs 43 (Winter 1991); Stephen Daniels & Lori Andrews, The Shadow of the Law:
Jury Decisions in Obstetrics and Gynecology Cases, in Victoria P. Rostow & RogerJ. Bulger, eds, 2 Medical
Professional Liability and the Delivery of Obstetrical Care 161 (Nat'l Acad Press, 1989).
26. See, for example, Mark Peterson, Susan Sarma & Michael Shanley, Punitive Damages:
Empirical Findings 13-14, Tables 2.5, 2.6 (RAND, 1987) (punitive damages awarded in only 2% of the
malpractice cases tried in San Francisco and Cook County from 1980 to 1984).
27. This study on whether imposing specific practice standards for patient care improves
medical outcomes and reduces malpractice claim risk for anesthesiologists was conducted at Stanford
University by Doctors John P. Bunker and Eugene Dong (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation grant
number 12409), with data for a ten-year base line study provided by two doctor-owned carriers
representing some 500 anesthesiologists and 500 obstetricians. (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
Grints that have not been completed or for which research findings have not yet been published will
be cited subsequently according to the Foundation's grant number.)
28. See, for example, Frank T. Flannery, et al, Abstract: Chest Pain in the Emergency Department, 19
Annals Emergency Med 608 (May 1990).
29. This two part study is being conducted at the University of Minnesota by Doctors Edward
Ciriacy and Doris Brooker (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation grant number 12407).
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B. Further Needs for Information and Analysis
Some important questions still remain only partially answered. Given our
increased knowledge about the unexpectedly high frequency of negligently
caused injury, one need is for greater understanding about why malpractice
occurs. Some studies now under way are seeking early indicators to identify
physicians who are prone to malpractice so that timely interventions or
strategies for avoidance can be introduced. 30
Significant among findings of the California and New York studies is that
cases of medical injury from negligence vastly exceed claims for liability
compensation. This points up our need to know more about the "claiming
behavior" of patients. Little is understood about what influences some to
bring claims and others not to do so. Two substantial studies of this sort are
near completion, one focusing on several surgical services and the other
involving orthopedic, emergency, and obstetrical care.si Although the
subject is of great importance, information is difficult to obtain, and devising
appropriate methodology for studies likely to produce "hard" data is
challenging. The availability of workable models in the current studies could
help encourage others to explore this area further.
There is special need to clarify the extent of "defensive medicine" and its
impact on health care. Despite widespread willingness to admit that
significant defensive medicine exists, there is little agreement about its extent
or even its definition. A 1987 American Medical Association estimate of some
$12 billion dollars of extra services in 198532 is being used by some as the
engine to drive different approaches to reform based on need for cost
containment. A key question about any such estimate is the reliability of the
information on which it is based. Even those who are willing to accept large
cost projections are sometimes cynical about how many procedures are
undertaken for economic benefit in addition to their possible legal utility.
Some lawyers also believe that defensive practices often stem from physicians'
misunderstanding of the law, which could be remedied by better educating
doctors on the subject.
30. Studies currently near completion are being conducted at the Oregon Foundation for
Medical Excellence (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation grant number 14044, Dennis J. Mazur,
principal investigator), and at the Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public Health
(Robert Wood Johnson Foundation grant number 12419, Stephen Teret. principal investigator).
Research by Roger A. Rosenblatt and others associated with the Department of Family Medicine,
University of Washington, is developing strategies that would focus on reducing probability of
negligence in obstetrical care in order to increase the number of providers willing to extend care to
socially vulnerable populations (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation grant number 14046).
31. The study of surgical patients is being conducted through the Department of Surgery,
University of Chicago (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation grant number 473-ABC, with further
support from the American Bar Foundation). It is reviewing experience in a burn center, an
intensive care unit, and a surgical floor. A study at the Health Policy Center, Vanderbilt Institute for
Public Policy Studies, Vanderbilt University is focusing on birth-related, orthopedics, and
emergency-room related injuries (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation grant number 14045).
32. This seems to be the only systematically generated quantitative estimate. See Roger A.
Reynolds, John A. Rizzo & Mai-tin L. Gonzalez, The Cost of Medical Professional Liability, 257 J Am Med
Ass'n 2776-81 (May 22/29, 1987). For an analysis of this study, see Sloan & Bovbjerg, Health Ins
Ass'n Am Res Bull at 25 (cited in note 22).
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Another major problem with using any estimate is that there is no broad
agreement on what constitutes "undesirable" defensive medicine. Much of
what some might include within the rubric of defensive medicine might be
considered effective quality assurance measures by others. In its most
pejorative sense, a definition would encompass only those interventions or
procedures undertaken for the sole purpose of safeguarding providers from
the threat of malpractice claims rather than promoting the health of patients.
Such activities would indeed be wasteful, unethical, and perhaps illegal.3 3 But
as one begins to enlarge the definition, it quickly shades into issues of cost
containment and determination of whether the incremental cost is justified for
certain expensive procedures that indeed give better, albeit marginally
important, diagnostic information. The definition should further include
what is known as "negative" defensive medicine, that is, societal costs of
health care providers turning some patients away or curtailing or abandoning
practice. Although obtaining reliable information about this would be
difficult, it would seem necessary for assessing the true impact of the tort
system on health care.
Better understanding of all these issues is important. This will require not
only funds but assurances of continuing access to sources of information.
Some providers and insurers holding such data have been reluctant to allow
its use "out of house" even with promises of confidentiality from nonpartisan
researchers, perhaps reflecting a new category of "defensive record keeping."
In other cases, cooperation may be regarded as an unnecessary bother or
expense that is unlikely to assist in their normal operations.
Although legal scholars recently have also paid increased attention to
medical injury compensation schemes in other countries, 34 this remains an
area where further review of the experience could be fruitful for further
deliberations in the United States. One value is that they allow a look at
schemes already in place, sometimes in countries with legal systems similar to
our own.
35
C. New Appreciation of Limitations of the Tort System
We also have learned through experience that the tort system has limited
utility for dealing with some areas of medical malpractice. A great strength of
33. Some state legislatures have enacted specific prohibitions. See, for example, Fla Stat Ann
§ 766.111 (West, 1991), which provides that "[n]o health care provider . . . shall order, procure,
provide, or administer unnecessary diagnostic tests, which are not reasonably calculated to assist the
health care provider in arriving at a diagnosis and treatment of a patient's condition." Violation is a
ground for disciplinary action, and one who prevails in an action based on violation of the law can
recover attorneys' fees and costs. Id.
34. See, for example, Walter Gellhorn, Medical Malpractice Litigation (U.S.)-Medical Mishap
Compensation (N.Z.), 73 Cornell L Rev 170 (1988); Marilyn M. Rosenthal, Dealing With Medical
Malpractice: The British and Swedish Experience 174-86 (Duke U Press, 1988); Patricia M. Danzon, The
"Crisis" in Medical Malpractice: A Comparison of Trends in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and
Australia, 18 L Med & Health Care 48 (Spring-Summer 1990).
35. Donald N. Dewees, Michael]. Trebilcock & Peter C. Coyte, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: A
Comparative Empirical Perspective, 54 L & Contemp Probs 217 (Winter 1991).
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the common law, as exemplified in the tort system, has been its ability to
respond to change. This attribute stems from development and application of
principles and standards, rather than rigid rules, to reflect changes in custom
and technology. But change that occurs too rapidly may not be mirrored in
custom without substantial time lag, and procedural delays now common in
our legal system can complicate the problem of determining the standard that
was applicable at a particular time in the past. Explosive change in medical
technology and increasing scientific knowledge in recent years have tested the
tort system's capacity for timely and effective response.
Despite this, the tort system probably has served a greater role in
upholding standards of quality than has generally been credited.3 6 When
other control procedures are lacking or inadequate, the tort system provides a
mechanism through which "reasonable" standards can be determined and
enforced. What is described as the system's deterrent factor thus can play a
significant factor in medical quality control, though it may be of declining
importance because of reinforced disciplinary procedures and more effective
institutional and peer review practices.
There is also reason to assert that the tort system on occasion has been
expanded beyond its traditional roles of compensation and quality control.
Perhaps the best example is the development of the informed consent
doctrine, which can be described as an attempt to use the tort system to
modify medical mores to increase the opportunity for meaningful patient
participation in medical decisionmaking. 37 By recognizing a physician's duty
to disclose to a patient both alternatives to treatment and significant risks
associated with a particular course of treatment, courts cast the doctrine in a
negligence mold. Many physicians responded that they had been singled out
for a duty not applicable to other professionals; they further complained that
the law's criteria for determining what they must disclose was so nebulous as
to be unworkable.
Eventually, most courts adopted the more restrictive approach to
determining whether a patient who had not been given sufficient information
would have undergone a particular procedure with such knowledge (a
necessary element of proof to satisfy the causation requirement of
negligence). The majority standard is what a "reasonable patient" would do
if well informed, rather than what the particular claimant would have done.3 8
This approach has the practical effect of limiting the number of actions based
36. Orley H. Lindgren, Ronald Christensen & Don Harper Mills, Medical Malpractice Risk
Management Early Warning Systems, 54 L & Contemp Probs 23 (Spring 1991).
37. For general background about the purpose and development of this doctrine, see I
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, Making Health Care Decisions: A Report on the Legal and Ethical Implications of
Informed Consent in the Patient-Practitioner Relationship (US Gov't Printing Office, 1982).
38. The author's suggestion that the informed consent doctrine may have placed undue strains
on the tort system is not meant as a retraction of his belief that it is highly desirable to increase
patient information and participation. WalterJ. Wadlington, Breaking the Silence of Doctor and Patient,
93 Yale L J 1640 (1984). But to afford genuine individual autonomy, it seems necessary that
disclosures consider the individual patient's idiosyncrasies, an important factor that soon was
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solely on lack of informed consent.3 9 The most significant consent cases
under the majority interpretation are those involving high-risk, elective
procedures. 40  In addition to this judicial gloss, many state legislatures
adopted provisions limiting or prohibiting challenges by patients who
acknowledged in writing before treatment that they received adequate
information or waived their right to receive it.4 1
The rise and decline of the informed consent doctrine should leave us with
serious questions about the limitations of the tort system as a modifier of
medical mores. There is little question that the doctrine has been widely
misunderstood by physicians. In retrospect, they should not have been
expected to distinguish readily between a requirement of obtaining pro forma
consent to avoid a battery action and a duty to make appropriate disclosure to
avoid a claim based on negligence. In the end, it was the framing of the
doctrine in negligence and the law's penchant for fairness of application 42 that
has made liability relatively easy to circumvent, even in instances where a
patient might have chosen a different alternative after learning more about
alternatives or risks. It is of some consolation that physician/patient
communication appears to have improved since the doctrine was introduced.
But whether such an experiment in behavior modification of physicians
through tort law soon will reoccur is doubtful.
D. Possible Effects of Evolving Structural Changes in Health Care
Recognition of the importance of non-legal and non-insurance factors as
components of the problem of medical injury points up the need for
exploration of how ongoing structural'changes in health care delivery can
affect medical injury and how it should be compensated.
The complexity of the health care system has not always been recognized
or appreciated by legal thinkers. Partly this is because lawyers in the field
ignored in judicial treatment of the doctrine. For more review of the informed consent doctrine and
its conceptual underpinnings, seeJ. Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient (The Free Press, 1984).
39. The action for informed consent has sometimes been described as "parasitic" because it is
typically an "add on" to an action for negligent performance of a specific procedure. One defense to
the basic negligence attack may be that a particular untoward result can be expected in a significant
number of cases even when there is no negligence, thus raising the question whether the patient
should have been told of that possibility. See, for example, Cobbs v Grant, 8 Cal 2d 229, 502 P2d 1,
104 Cal Rptr 505 (1972).
40. If the alternative is death, the reasonable person probably would choose the procedure even
if the possibility of a lesser untoward outcome is known to be expectable. If the goal is purely
cosmetic, a reasonable person would be far less likely to assume major risks.
41. Some courts additionally decided that a customary standard of what physicians deem
important to disclose will be used to define the scope of the duty. See, for example, Bly v Rhoads, 216
Va 645, 222 SE2d 783 (1976).
42. The ostensible reason for introducing a "reasonable person" standard was the assumption
that most patients who unexpectedly suffer untoward consequences from a procedure would in
hindsight contend that their "informed" choice would have been different. This, it was argued,
might bias a jury determination. The introduction of statutory restrictions was important because
proof of whether a person was advised of particular risks and alternatives may be unreasonably
difficult to reconstruct after passage of a significant time period. However, critics of some of the
statutory provisions point out that the patient who signs a pre-treatment acknowledgement
frequently is unable to assess whether he or she has in fact received full disclosure.
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often have been narrowly specialized. Relatively few possess such global
understanding that they can be expected to appreciate how changes
introduced for one purpose might have unanticipated side effects elsewhere.
Correspondingly, health care administrators and practitioners generally have
been unsophisticated about the legal system. Problems also have been
produced or exacerbated by strained relationships and poor communication
between physicians and doctors. It would be unfortunate if this lack of
breadth and rapport should preclude appropriate consideration of the past
decade's major changes in our health care system. For example, the model of
physician as "loner" has given way to broad acceptance of group practice.
Medical care is viewed widely as a business, and increasingly the health care
system is assimilated to a regulated industry.
In the current environment, "buyers" of care, such as insurers, employers,
and federal agencies, can considerably influence treatment choices by
determining what procedures they will agree to cover and how much they
will pay for them. Wide disparity in the economic situation of patients, based
both on their assets (and willingness to deplete them) and their insurance
coverage (or lack of it), has led some to fear that soon we will have a
multitiered health care system sharply differentiated on qualitative bases. In
such an environment, fixing standards for purposes of compensation could be
even more complex, perhaps resulting in a combination of tort and contract
actions to recover for medical injury.
An ongoing development of potentially great import is the erosion of the
near-exclusive, standard-setting authority accorded physicians through
judicial acceptance of customary standards established by "expert" testimony.
Some fear that continuance of this trend not only will generate frictions
between doctors, hospitals, and other providers, but also will lead to conflicts
with the legal system if courts hearing tort actions apply standards of
"reasonableness" that differ from those of third-party payors. Widespread
legal clashes may not materialize under the present system, however, because
any major reshaping of physician practices might be reflected in the tort
system's reliance on custom as the appropriate standard. 43 The problems
might also be handled through potential extension of liability to third-party
payors based on unreasonable limitations on payment authorization. 44 Such
concerns were acknowledged to some extent in a little known (and seldom
used) federal statute provision that establishes immunity for conformance
with standards set by Professional Review Organizations ("PROs" or
"PSROs"). 4 5 Recent efforts to establish practice parameters or guidelines,
43. See generally Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice
Litigation, 54 L & Contemp Probs 117 (Spring 1991).
44. For what is regarded as the opening salvo in such an attack, see Wickline v California, 192 Cal
App 3d 1630, 239 Cal Rptr 810 (1986).
45. See 42 USCA § 1320c-6 (stating that compliance with a PRO standard should not be
considered negligence); John R. Ball, PSRO-An Alternative to the Medical Malpractice System as a Quality
Assurance Mechanism, 36 Md L Rev 566 (1977); Henry E. Simmons & John R. Ball, PSRO and the
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including a legislatively sanctioned demonstration in Maine, illustrate further
searches for appropriate responses. 46
An expectable consequence of characterizing health care as a business is
that goals of greater efficiency and effective cost containment are of greater
importance. Utilization review and risk management procedures, as well as
more sophisticated record keeping systems, have become routine.
Reorientation of the liability system, by whatever means, to hold down costs
and make them more predictable or to provide more efficient and egalitarian
reimbursement for medical injuries, should hold considerable attraction in
such an environment. Opportunities to introduce approaches already
accepted in other business settings, such as insurance ratings based on
experience, 47 are ample because of their comparatively low use in some parts
of the health care market.
Other relevant changes in the health care system include growing
fascination with "outcomes research ' ' 48 that is increasingly shared by
"buyers" of services as well as health services researchers. Information from
such studies might be used in the future not only to determine what
procedures should be covered but also to assess whether particular treatments
are "reasonable" in terms of establishing a legal standard for negligence.
Addition of reporting systems and information banks for malpractice
payments and disciplinary actions has increased the information available to
hospitals and licensing agencies during the credentialing process. Some of
these approaches have the potential to minimize medical malpractice, while
others hold promise for replacing the deterrent or "quality control" factor
that some fear losing if we depart from a fault-based compensation system.
All could contribute significantly to a growing information base that should
help in fine tuning past legal responses as well as shaping new ones.
Dissolution of the Malpractice Suit, 6 U Toledo L Rev 739 (1975);Joseph H. King, In Search of a Standard
of Carefor the Medical Profession: The "Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 Vand L Rev 1213, 1267-75 (1975).
46. Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing Physician Liability, 54 L &
Contemp Probs 87 (Spring 1991); Hall, 54 L & Contemp Probs 117 (cited in note 43). Chapter 931
of Maine Public Law included a general package of legislative responses to medical malpractice
concerns. Maine Public Laws ch 931 (West, 1990). Two unusual provisions were a demonstration
project for development of "practice parameters" as well as "risk management protocols" for
electing physicians from three specialty groups: anesthesia, emergency medicine, and obstetrics and
gynecology. Under the Act, the State Board of Registration in Medicine will adopt parameters and
protocols under Maine's Administrative Procedures Act. An interesting twist to the legislation is that
while a participating physician or that physician's employer may introduce the parameters or
protocols into evidence as an affirmative defense, they cannot be used affirmatively against the
physician unless he or she raises the issue. See 24 Me Rev Stat Ann § 2975 (1990).
47. Harold S. Luft, Patricia P. Katz & Douglas G. Pinney, Risk Factors for Hospital Malpractice
Exposure: Implications for Managers and Insurers, 54 L & Contemp Probs 43 (Spring 1991).
48. See, for example, John E. Wennberg, Outcomes Research, Cost Containment, and the Fear of Health
Care Rationing, 323 New EngJ Med 1202 (October 25, 1990).
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III
GAUGING THE CLIMATE FOR CHANGE
There is no shortage of official and unofficial reports urging further
reform.49 The Bush administration recognized medical community concern
at the highest level recently when the President pledged to help "restore
common sense and fairness to America's medical malpractice system."
50
Current attitudes of the medical community are difficult to assess. There
seems to be a sense that the legal system is not working properly, even after
many changes. Fear of dire financial results from legal claims remains
troubling to individual practitioners, and there seems to be increased
resentment of what doctors consider legal meddling in medical practice. A
continuing sore point is a claims process that many physicians regard as
carrying unnecessary and undeserved risk of professional obloquy. But some
physicians doubt the likelihood of ever dealing effectively with their principal
concerns through the legal system. As a result, interest in reforms more likely
to be symbolic than efficacious is waning. 51
There are also signs of popular dissatisfaction and disillusionment tort
reform initiatives, particularly some of the more cost-effective changes
engrafted on the tort system for medical injury. Damage "caps" may be
unduly limiting awards, and other reforms may be increasing the complexity
and cost of litigating claims, that is, limiting the number of claims by elevating
the threshold of economic feasibility for attorney representation. Many
persons are disturbed, however, that such restrictions may inequitably burden
the most seriously injured persons. While it remains popular for physicians to
brand contingent fees as a major stimulant to litigation, and many states now
limit such compensation, such fees also certainly serve to limit the number of
claims by controlling access to the system. 52 Even when the case for legal
liability seems strong, a claim for relatively small damages can be too
49. The General Accounting Office ("GAO") has recommended the development of model state
laws that would include some typical malpractice tort reforms that the GAO deemed cost effective.
US Gen Acct'g Office, Medical Malpractice, A Framework for Action 19-28, 30-31 (1987). The GAO has
also recommended that experimentation with various alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
should be encouraged and that demonstration projects to determine their efficiency and efficacy
should be funded by the HHS.
Among conclusions of the Institute of Medicine Committee to Study Medical Professional
Liability and the Delivery of Obstetrical Care in 1989 were that tort reforms implemented since the
mid-1970s were an insufficient response to the special needs of obstetrical care-givers, and that states
should begin to focus on alternatives to the tort system. Again it was recommended that federal
support should be extended to demonstration projects.
Still another exhortation for further action came in the Report of the Task Force on Medical
Liability and Practice (HHS, 1987).
50. This language was reproduced in Amy Goldstein & Ann Devroy, Buh Urges Malpractice
Revisions, Wash Post A8 col 1 (February 23, 1990). A White House task force also has been formed,
and the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research is moving toward expanded sponsorship of
research and demonstrations on the subject of medical malpractice.
51. For a perceptive discussion of the phenomenon of symbolic reform, see F. Patrick Hubbard,
The Physicians' Point of View Concerning Medical Malpractice: A Sociological Perspective on the Symbolic
Importance of "Tort Reform, " 23 Ga L Rev 295 (1989).
52. This was recognized in the 1973 HEW Report mentioned earlier. See note 2.
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expensive for an attorney to undertake on a contingent fee basis. Nor would
an injured person want to employ an attorney on a "billable hours" basis if
the cost would approximate or exceed the anticipated recovery. 53
In Indiana, home of the first broad medical malpractice tort reform
package,54 strong media criticism recently has been leveled that those
provisions have affected injured patients unfavorably. 55 The attacks have
centered on a lethargic claims pace, unfairness of damages awarded to
severely injured patients, 56 and inadequate disciplinary responses. Although
the criticism has attracted media attention beyond the state, it is uncertain
whether this portends a broader backlash. 57
Opposition to change should be expected not only from those whose legal
specialties could be affected but also from others who question whether a
medical malpractice crisis has ever existed or whether some injuries should be
treated differently from others because they are medically induced. A "go
slow" approach can also be expected from some who are unconvinced that
major change, such as instituting a substitute compensation system, is
necessary to preserve health care quality and access or that any existing
proposals would respond more effectively than the tort system, regardless of
its shortcomings.
On balance, it seems probable that there is sufficient interest and
momentum at least to initiate some incremental, even evolutionary, changes
at this point, if they are not too extensive and do not introduce significant new
bureaucracy. Given diminished pressure for further change in some quarters
and potential opposition and even backsliding from existing changes in
others, the likelihood of major restructuring in the near term seems unlikely
unless claims or premiums rise sharply.
53. A further response advocated by some members of the health care industry would tax all
costs and attorneys' fees to the loser in malpractice actions (or to the side failing to improve on the
last settlement offer). Because this approach could further deter good faith claims with significant
chance of recovery, to justify its introduction for medical malpractice alone would in fairness seem to
require a showing of special incidence of frivolous claims in the area. Given that a relatively small
percentage of medical malpractice cases ever go to trial, and that the percentage of successes among
them is not unduly high, such special need seems questionable.
54. See Eleanor D. Kinney & William P. Gronfein, Indiana's Malpractice System: No-Fault by
Accident?, 54 L & Contemp Probs 169 (Winter 1991).
55. See, for example, Malpractice Law Stacked Against Victims, The Indianapolis Star I col 1 (June
26, 1990).
56. Indiana has a damage ceiling for medical malpractice awards that only recently was raised
from $500,000 to $750,000, and all claims above $100,000 are handled by a special state
commission. According to a study conducted by Professor Eleanor Kinney, actual amounts received
by patients suffering high severity injuries seem no lower, and perhaps are higher, than those in
neighboring states without comparable damage caps. See Kinney & Gronfein, 54 L & Contemp
Probs at 181-82 (cited in note 54).
57. The Indiana protests already have received national attention. See, for example, Isabel
Wilkerson, Indiana Law at Center of Malpractice Debate, NY Times AI I col I (August 20, 1990).
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IV
A LOOK AT PROPOSALS UNDER CONSIDERATION
Potential reforms can be characterized along several dimensions. One is
the nature of problems addressed. Here, objectives and reforms often focus
on (1) inefficiencies of delay, cost, and complexity; (2) the tendency to
encourage over-utilization in some cases, while diminishing access to care in
others; and (3) the perceived uncertainty and inconsistency of awards.
Reform proposals may address all or only some of these elements. Reform
efforts can also differ in their expected mode of implementation. Factors here
include whether an approach would call for federal or state action (or joint
cooperation); whether it could be voluntary or would require legislation
(perhaps to create a new administrative scheme); and whether it would be
effected by courts or through wholly new systems of investigation and dispute
resolution. Other important variables include the underlying conceptual base
for providing compensation and the measure and form of compensation.
Variables can be adapted in different proposals according to the specific goals
desired (lower cost, compensation for more persons, minimizing delays, or
simplifying procedures).58
Some promising approaches are largely procedural and could be relatively
simple to implement. A good illustration is the introduction of specially
tailored alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution. 59  But not all
"procedural" changes can be so easily introduced. For example, the
AMA/Specialty Societies proposal60  would require a major new
administrative entity for resolving claims, even though the plan is incremental
by virtue of its fault basis and adjudicatory orientation. 6' The magnitude of
the change is justified on the grounds that prior reform efforts, while
58. For greater discussion of the possible variables and how they might be combined, see
Kenneth A. Abraham, Medical Liability, A Conceptual Framework, 260 J Am Med Ass'n 68 (1988).
59. Metzloff, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 104-14 (cited in note 25).
60.. For a description of the proposal and its rationale, see Kirk B. Johnson, et al, A Fault-Based
Administrative Alternative for Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 Vand L Rev 1365 (1989); Elizabeth
H. Esty, AMA/Specialty Society Medical Liability Project: A Summary and Explanation of the Proposed
Administrative System for Resolving Medical Liability Disputes and Enhancing the Monitoring and Discipline of
Medical Practices (Institute of Medicine, July 1988) (contained in Study on the Liability Crisis and its
Effects on Obstetrics). To date, probably owing to the magnitude of the suggested changes, no state
has enacted the AMA plan. The plan represents such a radical restructuring of the methods by which
medical liability is determined that it is difficult to predict how the overall system would operate in
practice.
61. The AMA proposal posits the creation of a new state agency called the Medical Practices
Review Board (the "Board") to adjudicate medical malpractice disputes. See Tort Reform Codification:
Model Medical Liability and Patient Protection Act, I Courts, Health Science & L 87, 93-94, § 202(a)-(b)
(Georgetown U Med & L Ctrs, 1990). The proposal provides for a complex series of investigations,
expert reviews, and mandatory settlement procedures, culminating in a hearing in which the claimant
is represented by an attorney employed by the Board. Id at 93-99, §§ 202-208. In addition to
procedural innovations, the proposal includes several modifications of the substantive rules affecting
the assertion of malpractice claims, including redefinition of the standard of care, adoption of a
causation standard premising liability so long as the doctor's negligence was a "contributing factor"
in causing the injury, adoption of the minority rule on informed consent to focus on the adequacy of
the disclosure from the patient's perspective, and certain limits on the type or quantum of damages
to be collected. Id at 114-18, §§ 400-405.
[Vol. 54: No. 2
LEGAL RESPONSES TO PATIENT INJURY
ameliorating some of the system's shortcomings, have been employed for
over a decade without noticeably improving the system's overall
performance. 62
Another widely discussed approach is known as neo-no-fault. Based on
ideas put forward by Professor Jeffrey O'Connell,63 this scheme might be
implemented voluntarily or legislatively. It would allow a provider to offer
payment for all of a claimant's net economic damages (net of all other
sources). If made within a specific period after the patient's injury, such an
offer would either preempt current access to non-economic damages or allow
patients voluntarily to relinquish tort remedies.r 4
Offering providers and patients greater latitude to "tailor" approaches to
compensation in advance of medical injury by mutual agreement is an
alternative urged persuasively by Professor Richard Epstein, joined by
Professor Clark Havighurst, in a series of creative presentations. 65 Such
latitude also should be considered broadly as an alternative for private sector
tort reform, though skeptics question whether traditional market factors work
in the medical care setting or whether "bargaining" might be so one-sided as
to lead to the exploitation of patients. An initial, practical consideration
regarding such an approach is that "exculpatory contracts" between provider
and patient have been widely rejected in past judicial challenges. 66 This
entrenched jurisprudence makes it likely that wider use of contracting in this
area will need legislative approval unless courts finally are prepared to change
their views in light of a major trend toward private ordering in other contexts.
Other approaches to reform center on improved risk management 67 or
insurance. 68 In Part II, it was suggested that the "business" of health care
could be expected to become more efficient in its use of insurance methods
such as experience rating.6 9 Another approach under discussion would be to
relieve physicians of tort liability for hospital-based injury by substituting the
62. Johnson, et al, 42 Vand L Rev at 1376 (cited in note 60) ("These changes have been tried for
over a decade in most states without resolving the crisis surrounding the availability and affordability
of professional liability insurance."). Interestingly, the AMA proposal eschewed a no-fault solution,
finding that it "offends notions ofjustice and individual accountability by imposing liability on health
care providers even when they have done everything humanly possible to treat a patient but were
unable to prevent a bad outcome." Id.
63. See Jeffrey O'Connell, Neo-No-Fault Remedies for Medical Injures: Coordinated Statutory and
Contractual Alternatives, 49 L & Contemp Probs 125 (Spring 1986).
64. A version of such an approach, known as the Moore-Gephardt bill, was introduced in the
98th and 99th Congresses as HR 5400 and HR 3084, respectively. For discussion, see W. Henson
Moore & John S. Hoff, H.R. 3084: A More Rational Compensation System for Medical Malpractice, 49 L &
Contemp Probs 117 (Spring 1986).
65. See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, Am Bar
Found Res J 87 (1976); Clark C. Havighurst, Reforming Malpractice Law Through Consumer Choice, Health
Affairs 63 (Winter 1984); see generally Randall R. Bovbjerg & Clark C. Havighurst, eds, Medical
Malpractice: Can the Private Sector Find Relief?, 49 L & Contemp Probs (Spring 1986).
66. See, for example, Tunkl v Regents of Univ. of California, 60 Cal 2d 92, 82 Cal Rptr 33, 383 P2d
441 (1963). This rejection has been based at least partly on the "special" role of a provider, which
some courts have analogized to that of a fiduciary.
67. Lindgren, Christensen & Mills, 54 L & Contemp Probs 23 (cited in note 36).
68. Luft, Katz & Pinney, 54 L & Contemp Probs 43 (cited in note 47).
69. See notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
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hospital as the entity responsible for compensation. 70 Because a high
percentage of claims stem from hospital-based incidents, it is assumed that
this change would cover a large segment of significant injuries produced
through medical practice. The hospital would meet its financial responsibility
through insurance or self-insurance and could benefit from experience rating,
which already prevails for hospital responsibility. The latter would provide an
incentive for hospitals to "police" their medical staff more effectively. 7 1
Other asserted advantages include lessening the stigma that physicians feel is
associated with malpractice actions, and handling more evenly the problem of
sharp disparities in insurance premium rates according to individual medical
specialties.
An approach that takes a larger initial step than those preceding would be
installing a system to compensate without individualized proof of fault for
medical injuries listed in advance as "compensable events," 72 a system that
stands as a hybrid system between fault and no-fault. Such compensable
events are medical injuries that normally occur only infrequently when
patients receive good treatment. Listings based on medical avoidability are
not unlike considerations of fault, with the very large difference that
determinations are made in advance and on an epidemiological basis
(avoidability of a class of injuries). Administration would resemble no-fault-
an insurance-like process rather than a litigious one. Such a system could
replace tort law and litigation for many types of injury, but it could not be a
total replacement because it would cover only those events categorically
established as compensable. This sort of compensation scheme could be
introduced legislatively, or possibly through private agreement in
jurisdictions where such agreements are not banned by state constitutions or
jurisprudence. A key problem in the past has been developing an adequate
number of well-defined "events." Current research has used several data
bases to confirm the viability of such a scheme. 73
The most extreme change now realistically under consideration for
medical injury compensation would come through introduction of an
administratively operated no-fault scheme to replace current tort law.7 4
70. This longstanding idea is sometimes called "channeling" responsibility. For an extended
discussion, see Myron G. Steves, Jr., A Proposal to Improve the Cost to Benefit Relationships in the Medical
Professional Liability Insurance System, 1975 Duke L J 1305. One such proposal is suggested in the
Reporter's Study to the American Law Institute on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury
(1991).
71. Hospitals in many states have occupied a larger role in this regard through expansion of the
doctrine of corporate liability.
72. This idea originated with Professor Laurence Tancredi joined by Professor Clark
Havighurst. For a short history as well as its current status, see Laurence R. Tancredi & Randall R.
Bovbjerg, Rethinking Responsibility for Patient Injury: Accelerated-Compensation Events, A Malpractice and
Quality Reform Ripe for a Test, 54 L & Contemp Probs 147 (Spring 1991).
73. Tancredi and Bovbjerg have adopted the new term "accelerated compensation event"
("ACE"). Id.
74. A Reporter's Study prepared for the American Law Institute suggests that a "no-fault"
approach to liability for medical accidents should be regarded as "a serious and plausible alternative
in the ongoing debate about how best to deal with medical injuries." However, the study, which was
prepared for discussion and does not represent any official position of the Institute, concludes that
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Advantages seen in such an approach are greater process efficiency through
timely settlement and greater social efficiency through compensation for far
more injured persons. The latter is regarded as important because of the
perceived uncertainties today about who can recover and the often difficult
and expensive problems of proving negligence. Many physicians favor no-
fault for de-emphasizing the stigma they associate with a negligence action.
75
Others oppose it as an enormous expansion of the fiscal responsibility of the
medical system. 76 Though the role of fault is eliminated, implementing such a
scheme nevertheless requires case-by-case decisions about medical causation
to determine what injuries are covered, and some new entity probably would
need to be created for operating it.
77
A number of suggestions also have been made for structuring a no-fault
medical injury scheme along workers' compensation lines. 78  Major
opposition, aside from that by attorneys whose specialties would suffer, likely
would be based on potential cost or on concern about removing the tort
system's deterrence function.
When the California study was released in the 1970s, 79 it was thought that
the number of claims that would surface under a no-fault system would make
it prohibitively expensive. The New York study8" confirms both the high
incidence of adverse consequences and the large number of negligently
injured persons who do not seek compensation currently. However, in the
ten years between the two studies, costs of the liability system escalated to a
level that some believe makes introduction of a limited no-fault system at this
time economically viable. Its viability would depend on cost savings that
could be effected through means such as more efficient claims settlement and
substantial reductions in the measure and form of compensation.
such an approach initially can and should be introduced only on a voluntary or "elective" basis. 2
Reporter's Study on Enterprise Liability for Personal Injury 515-16 (Am L Institute, 1991).
75. In an interesting twist to this rationale, it appears that payments made by the commissions
administering the Virginia and Florida schemes need not be reported to the national data bank of
malpractice claims because there is no finding of liability on the part of the physician involved.
76. Mills, Boyden & Rubsamen, eds, Report on the Medical Insurance Feasibility Study (cited in note
17).
77. In some instances, a jurisdiction might choose to utilize the agency already administering
workers' compensation rather than forming a new administrative organization such as that required
by the AMA/Specialty Society proposal. See note 61 and accompanying text. The former pattern is
utilized by the limited systems adopted in Virginia and Florida for compensating neurologically
birth-defective infants.
78. An interdisciplinary team at the Midwest Institute for Health Care and Law drafted a model
medical accident compensation act based along these lines. See M. Martin M. Halley, et al, Medical
Malpractice Solutions: Systems and Proposals for Injury Compensation 205 (Thomas Pub, 1989). In Barry
Manuel, Professional Liability-A No Fault Solution, 322 New EngJ Med 627 (1990), Dr. Barry Manuel
proposed a scheme along workers' compensation lines that would be financed through a surcharge
on accident and health policies.
79. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
80. See notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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No-fault schemes now in place in Virginia and Florida for certain
neurologically defective infants are highly limited in scope8 l and have been
operational for only a short time. Unless expanded further, their experiences
may be of little help in economic predictions about the costs of a more
broadly applicable scheme.8 2  However, when current constitutional
challenges to them have worked through the judicial system, those results
could shed important light on the legal vulnerability of such plans in other
contexts. What the Virginia and Florida statutes do illustrate is that a more
radical system might be introduced to deal with one set of problems regarded
as having special impact when a particular level of political pressure for action
is reached.
V
AN AGENDA FOR ACTION
Given our increased understanding and the likelihood of learning more
soon, a next logical step for reformers would be to translate knowledge into
action. The current period of diminished pressure for "quick fixes" could
afford time for this step to be taken effectively, if funding agencies or entities
will recognize the need and promise as well as the special portal of
opportunity for fulfilling it that now exists.
Based on past experience, there is concern that the health care
establishment seldom willingly embraces major structural change of any sort
81. The limited nature of the Virginia statute is evident in its definition of "Birth-related
neurological injury":
injury to the brain or spinal cord of an infant caused by the deprivation of oxygen or
mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery or resuscitation in the
immediate post-delivery period in a hospital which renders the infant permanently
motorically disabled and (i) developmentally disabled or (ii) for infants sufficiently
developed to be cognitively evaluated, cognitively disabled. In order to constitute a "birth-
related neurological injury" within the meaning of this chapter, such disability shall cause
the infant to be permanently in need of assistance in all activities of daily living. This
definition shall apply to live births only and shall not include disability or death caused by
genetic or congenital abnormality, degenerative neurological disease, or maternal substance
abuse.
Va Code § 38.2-5001 (Michie, Repl Vol 1990). The scheme is triggered by a claim of "birth-related
neurological injury" in a delivery by a "participating physician" or in a "participating hospital." The
qualifying infant's legal relief consists of payment for medical, rehabilitative, and residential
expenses not reimbursable through other state or federal programs or private insurance reasonable
expenses incurred in filing a claim (including attorneys' fees); and loss of earnings from age eighteen
through sixty-five, which are conclusively presumed to be "fifty percent of the average weekly wage in
the Commonwealth of workers in the private, nonfarm sector." Id § 38.2-5009.
Absent clear and convincing evidence that the injury was willfully or intentionally caused, this
remedy excludes all others that the claimant otherwise might have against the participating entity.
Under the Act as recently amended, if only one entity (hospital or physician) was participating in the
program when the injury occurred, a tort action can be brought against the non-participant, but this
will be an election not to pursue recovery under the Act; if recovery under the Act is elected, the
Program can be subrogated to any malpractice action that could otherwise have been brought against
the non-participating physician or hospital. Id § 38.2-5002.
82. By the close of 1990, only two cases had been filed under the Virginia Act, and no payments
had been made. Six claims had been filed under the Florida Act, and three had been closed with
payment. See Walter J. Wadlington & J. Warren Wood III, Two "No-Fault" Compensation Schemes for
Birth Defects in the United States, 7 Professional Negligence 40 (1991).
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without at least a perception of crisis. If true, this is unfortunate. Rapid
responses under crisis conditions can hold poor long-term promise, and they
may delay introduction of better solutions after an approach to reform has
commenced under a flawed agenda. The current diminished sense of urgency
could make this time especially auspicious: there is enough concern to assure
continued exploration for solutions without a sense of panic that might
provoke inappropriate responses in the search for immediate solutions. By
the same token, it is important that the improved responses be readily
available when the next crisis begins.
The following agenda is based on the assumptions that this is a time when
reflection can continue in an atmosphere of diminished pressure, and when
virtually all affected parties are now concerned less with symbolic change than
with reaching identifiable goals. The items are not ordered by importance;
instead, they constitute an integrated approach to what might be described as
evolutionary change.
A. An Agenda in Outline
1. Continue to Develop Useable Knowledge About Malpractice. There is still much
to learn about the nature of malpractice and the problems associated with
current legal responses. If funding for information gathering and analysis
were to "dry up" at this stage, it would be a major blow to future reform.
Already it has been recognized widely that the problems of malpractice are
not confined to the legal system. Further research will have an additional role
of helping the medical community continue to fashion new and refine existing
measures designed to lessen the incidence of medical injury.
2. Undertake Trials and Demonstrations of New Approaches. Undertaking trials
and demonstrations of new approaches would be consistent with the view that
"fine tuning" past reforms will be inadequate. Innovative legal responses are
necessary if we are to deal fairly and efficiently with medical injury.
Until recently, few major proposals for change had reached the "post-
drawing board" stage of readiness for formal demonstration projects. Today
an increasing number are at or near that point, including a system based on
compensating "compensable events."-8 3 Other candidates for this include
neo-no-fault schemes and channeling of claims8 4 through hospitals. Some
proposals may be so sweeping that demonstration projects would not be
easily undertaken. The AMA and Medical Specialty Societies approach, for
example, has many interesting features, but a demonstration seemingly would
require the establishment of a major new claims resolution system even
though a fault orientation is maintained. Such a massive change raises serious
and perhaps unanswerable questions about its potential impact. In a climate
83. Tancredi & Bovbjerg, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 147 (cited in note 72).
84. See notes 63 & 70.
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characterized by concern about finances and wariness of change "for change's
sake," introduction of such a major new mechanism is likely to be difficult.85
Demonstrations are not inexpensive, yet they seem a good investment.
Most projects also will require governmental interest and commitment
beyond financial support.
3. Review and Fine Tune Existing Statutes. As noted earlier, there is evidence
that some legal reforms have affected claims and payments, while others have
accomplished little or nothing. Some have even created obstacles to pursuing
valid claims. As new, incremental changes are being considered or adopted, it
seems important for states to eliminate measures introduced in the absence of
adequate information if they have been established as unsuccessful. Similarly,
many states can improve on their more effective provisions by analyzing the
experience in other states that enacted different variations.
4. Take Special Steps to Assure that Research Is Translated into New and Innovative
Approaches. Although the step that should follow information gathering and
analysis is among the most important in the process of formulating responses,
it could easily be overlooked. The research results must be translated into
new and innovative approaches. Because of the complex issues involved in
such an endeavor, interdisciplinary cooperation among the professions will be
essential. A goal of producing truly innovative responses is unlikely to be
reached simply by holding conferences or convening occasional committees,
however distinguished the participants. It will instead require encouraging
and offering released time and other essential support for experienced and
imaginative individuals from areas including medicine, law, health
administration, and economics to produce workable models that consider
many different facets of our present legal and health care systems. Having
85. Researchers at Georgetown are studying the feasibility of implementing the AMA proposal.
As part of their analysis, they commissioned papers from experts in various fields to gauge their
reactions to the proposal. The papers provide an interesting blend of opinion. One point made is
that the proposal represents a major advance over past negative approaches taken by organized
medicine. See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Reforming a Proposed Tort Reform: Improving on the American Medical
Association's Proposed Administrative Tribunal for Medical Malpractice, 1 Courts, Health Science & L 19, 20
(Georgetown U Med & L Ctrs, 1990). See generally Mary Ann Baily, The Administrative Approach to
Medical Malpractice Disputes, 1 Courts, Health Science & L 29 (Georgetown U Med & L Ctrs, 1990)
(suggesting that the AMA approach would likely result in a clearer enunciation of the standard of
care); Laura L. Morlock, An Assessment of Potential Impact on Claims Resolution and the Quality of Medical
Care, 1 Courts, Health Science & L 35 (Georgetown U Med & L Centers, 1990) (noting that the
success of Maryland's pre-trial screening panel indicates that the basic premise of the AMA proposal
is sound). The concerns expressed include whether the Board would possess the necessary
resources and commitment to enforce the negligence standard effectively, and whether it would be
sufficiently impartial. See Baily, The Administrative Approach at 31 (cited above) (questioning adequacy
of financing); Bovbjerg, Reforming a Proposed Tort Reform at 22 (cited above) (questioning
independence). Not surprisingly, the paper prepared by a representative of the plaintiffs bar was
highly critical; the author opined that the proposal was unconstitutional, unfair, unsound, and in the
final analysis un-American. J. Douglas Peters, Critique of the American Medical Association's Model Medical
Liability and Practices Reform Act, 1 Courts, Health Science & L 51, 55 (Georgetown U Med & L Ctrs,
1990) ("[Tlhe act's design is fatally flawed and probably irreparable .... [O]nly kamikaze legislators
will ride in this Zero.").
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good research in hand does not mean that producing statutory responses
becomes a simple or perfunctory process.
5. Selectively Make Further, Incremental Changes. In addition to continued fine
tuning of existing provisions, a number of changes could be considered for
introduction without further demonstrations. Several alternative dispute
resolution procedures provide perhaps the best illustration. 86 Also to be
considered are variations on existing, limited no-fault approaches such as
those adopted in Virginia and Florida.
Incremental new changes at this stage should be carefully evaluated in
advance in accordance to what it is expected to accomplish and what evidence
exists that it may successfully fill that expectation.
6. Continue to Review the Need for More Revolutionary Changes. Of proposals
under serious discussion, an administratively operated, no-fault scheme for
serious injuries would effect the most sweeping change. Such a scheme was
under serious consideration in New York recently. 87 However, in his 1991
State of the State address, Governor Mario Cuomo retreated somewhat by
announcing that only a birth-related, no-fault scheme would be introduced for
legislative consideration this year.88 Nevertheless, serious calls for such a
system continue to be made.
Comparisons of costs of the medical injury compensation system in New
York in 1984 and California in 1974 indicate that the prospects of devising an
economically feasible system are much greater today. As time goes on, it also
may be considered more socially desirable. While the current political and
insurance climates would indicate that legislatures are unlikely to feel
sufficiently pressured to install such major change now, in the next "crisis" it
may hold far greater attraction. Indeed, the gradual evolution of limited "no-
fault" schemes may be the evolutionary forerunners of such a larger system.
B. Who Should Take the Initiative to Implement an Agenda?
An issue now being debated more frequently is whether medical
malpractice liability should remain largely within the purview of state
regulation or whether the federal government should further expand its role.
The issues may be more political than legal. Despite a spate of recent
legislative initiatives, 89 federal preemption in even part of an area such as
86. See, for example, Metzloff, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 104-14 (cited in note 25).
87. Indeed, exploring the feasibility of such an approach was considered one of the purposes of
the Harvard Medical Practice Study. See note 19.
88. See Malpractice Reforms Outlined by Cuomo, NY LJ I col 5 (January 11, 1991).
89. See, for example, the Medical Injury Compensation Fairness Act of 1991, S 1232, 102d
Cong, 1st Sess (June 6, 1991) (introduced by Sen Domenici); Health Care Liability Reform and
Quality of Care Improvement Act of 1991, S 1123, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (May 22, 1991) (introduced
by Sen. Hatch); Ensuring Access through Medical Liability Reform Act of 1991, S 489, 102d Cong,
1st Sess (February 26, 1991) (introduced by Sen. Hatch); Medical Malpractice Dispute Resolution
Act of 1990, HR 4566, 101st Cong, 1st Sess (April 19, 1990) (introduced by Rep. NancyJohnson).
For a discussion of the Domenici bill, see Clark C. Havighurst & Thomas B. Metzloff, S. 1232-A Late
Entry in the Race for Malpractice Reform, 54 L & Contemp Probs 179 (Spring 1991).
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torts is likely to be opposed by many states. A more palatable federal role in
the near term probably would be to require state adoption of certain
minimum provisions for change, using Medicare and Medicaid financing as
the pressure point. This could allow states flexibility to experiment. Whether
or not malpractice is to remain largely within state control, the need for
workable models will remain.
C. How the Agenda Might Change
Several identifiable factors could make this agenda obsolete quickly. One
factor would be major restructuring of the tort system, or some significant
part of it, independent of medical malpractice concerns. Successful
introduction of a health care scheme with universal access could serve as a
catalyst for broader and more rapid change. Because of the growing
consensus of need to expand such access, this is a realistic development to
anticipate. While tort reform might not necessarily accompany such change,
increasing access could reinforce the search for better responses to medical
injury and exert even greater pressure on costs. For example, the two could
be regarded as appropriate for inclusion jointly in any broad legislative
package. Or if medical injury and its attendant costs and complexities were
deemed an obstacle to expanding access, it could be considered necessary to
deal with it.9° The choice of approach for expanding access thus could
significantly affect both the perception of need for medical injury reform and
the means for achieving it. While medical injury reform did not accompany
introduction of a national health care system in England, there was
considered no need at the time. Recently, however, a system of Crown
indemnity has been introduced.
VI
CONCLUSION
As long as the liability insurance climate improves, it is doubtful that state
legislatures or the federal government will feel significant pressure to pursue
major medical malpractice liability reforms, though continued rumblings of
serious concerns should sustain attention on at least some of the many fronts
for reform. The most important strategies likely to be accepted in the near
term can be characterized as moving us forward in an evolutionary fashion.
Such additions would supplement the present system and also might be
incremental steps toward a much different system of dealing with medical
injury. Perhaps the most important consideration is for us to take advantage
of the "non-crisis" atmosphere of the day. If there is no renewed "crisis," we
90. Other potential scenarios would vary with the choice of scheme for expanding access. For
example, if health insurance, public or private, were deemed the appropriate course, issues would
arise of whether there would be subrogation of the program to the claim for health care required by
malpractice or, alternatively, whether such payments would be the only recovery, with malpractice
actions ceasing to exist in most cases. Compare George J. Annas, Barbara F. Katz & Robert G.
Trakimas, Medical Malpractice Litigation Under National Health Insurance, 1975 Duke L J 1335.
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will have lost little by doing so. If acute pressures reappear, as seems most
likely, we will find ourselves prepared to respond with less flailing.9'
91. See Bovbjerg, 22 UC Davis L Rev at 556 (cited in note 8) ("One can hope that reform issues
will not now ebb in the late 1980s as they did in the 1970s; it would be encouraging to meet-or even
to preempt-the next crisis with more information and a better game plan.").

